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 This dissertation studies migration and remittances through a macroeconomic 
framework. In the first chapter, I compare the impact of national and regional borders on 
the migration decisions of agents. Migration between regions within a country is 
observed to be higher than migration between countries; moreover, both types of 
migration respond similarly to differences in economic opportunities. These observations 
are analyzed with the aid of a symmetric two-country dynamic general equilibrium model 
with labor mobility. The model is solved using dynamic programming and estimates of 
the latent cost of crossing borders are obtained through the method of simulated 
moments. The results show that the mean moving cost associated with crossing an 
international border is more than twice that of crossing a regional border. One important 
consequence of this high cost is that the mere presence of a national border decreases 
aggregate welfare by about 0.15% in terms of annual consumption for countries such as 
Sweden and Denmark. In the second and third chapters, I analyze how remittances by 




the structure of production between traded and non-traded sectors in developing 
economies.  For both these chapters, I solve a macroeconomic model with an endogenous 
remittance decision. However, while the second chapter considers remittances driven by 
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The Cost of a Border in a Model of Aggregate Fluctuations 
 
This paper compares the impact of national and regional borders on the migration 
decisions of agents. Data from Denmark and Sweden indicate that even in the absence of 
legal restrictions on cross-border movements of workers, migration between regions 
within a country is considerably higher than migration between countries; moreover, 
both types of migration respond similarly to differences in economic opportunities. 
These observations are analyzed with the aid of a symmetric two-country dynamic 
general equilibrium model with labor mobility. The model is solved using dynamic 
programming and estimates of the latent cost of crossing borders are obtained through 
the method of simulated moments. The results show that the mean moving cost 
associated with crossing an international border is more than twice that of crossing a 
regional border. One important consequence of this high cost is that the mere presence of 
a national border decreases aggregate welfare by about 0.15% in terms of annual 
consumption for countries such as Sweden and Denmark. The results also underscore the 
importance of explicitly considering the higher costs associated with crossing national 
borders while estimating potential welfare gains from the opening of borders. In a 
counterfactual example involving Denmark and Sweden, gains from an open border are 









Empirical evidence suggests that while choosing where to live and work, 
individuals are greatly influenced by their economic prospects in various locations. 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Kennan and Walker (2006) are two papers, among many 
that establish this link. Aggregate trends in migration are the collective consequence of 
all the individual decisions. These aggregate changes in labor due to migration in turn 
have a significant impact on the economic prospects of the regions under consideration. 
Thus, to understand both individual migration decisions and the impact of overall 
migration on an economy, it is essential to establish a sound understanding of the main 
factors that influence migration. 
The presence of a national border appears to play a huge role in the migration 
decision of agents even when there are no legal restrictions to the cross-border 
movement of labor. A national border is often more than just a man-made line drawn on 
a map to demarcate territories and jurisdictions. Crossing a border could involve a 
change in language, currency, labor and retirement security, regulations, governments, 
socio-cultural environment, geography etc. and any or all of these factors can influence 
the migration decision of agents. Regional borders may also involve a similar transition, 
although often with a much smaller magnitude of difference. 
To study the difference between regional and national borders, it is essential to 
have inter-country and inter-region migration data for a pair of countries that allow free 
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movement of labor across one another. By comparing inter-region data to inter-country 
data, one can estimate the true effect of national border. 
Denmark and Sweden form one such country pair. Denmark and Sweden are both 
part of the Nordic Common Labor Market established in 1954. Moreover, Denmark and 
Sweden are similar countries: Danish and Swedish are mutually intelligible languages 
and both share a common Scandinavian heritage. They have similar economies and 
political regimes and their climactic conditions are not too dissimilar. Although there are 
some differences between the two countries in terms of culture, currency etc., both are 
very similar to each other, particularly when compared to other pairs of bordering 
countries around the world. Since the two countries are so alike, one can attempt to 
isolate the impact of national border on migration decisions by comparing migration 
between Denmark and Sweden to migration across regions of Denmark.   
In line with other studies, empirical work reported in this paper suggests that 
migration across Denmark and Sweden is indeed influenced by economic conditions. 
While there are also notable trend effects to migration, the data show that aggregate 
migration in each period responds closely to fluctuations in aggregate business activity 
in the two countries. 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the difference between the growth rate of 
migration from Denmark to Sweden and the growth rate of migration from Sweden to 
Denmark is significantly correlated with the difference between the growth rate of 
Swedish GDP per worker and the growth rate of Danish GDP per worker. This is 
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intuitive - in periods when the economy in Sweden is booming relative to the economy 
in Denmark, there is a boom in the number of migrants from Denmark to Sweden 
relative to the number of migrants from Sweden to Denmark. In other words, the data 
suggest that migrants respond to economic conditions by moving in larger numbers to 










































Figure 2 shows that a similar statement can be made about migration within 
Denmark where the provinces of Denmark have been aggregated to form two distinct 
territories - East and West Denmark (the former includes the regions of North Jutland, 
mid Jutland and South Denmark while the latter consists of the capital region of 
Denmark and Zealand). If East Denmark is experiencing a boom relative to West 
Denmark, there is also a boom in the number of migrants from West Denmark to East 
Denmark relative to the number of migrants from East Denmark to West Denmark. 
These two figures indicate that both Danish and Swedish international migrants 
as well as East and West Danish inter-regional migrants respond to differences in GDP 






However, in terms of magnitudes the number of inter-regional migrants far 
outweighs the number of international migrants as a fraction of the labor force. Figure 3 
shows that despite the similarities between the two countries, inter-regional migration in 
Denmark is far greater than international migration even though in both cases, migrants 






















































The main features of the data displayed in Figures 1, 2 and 3 are summarized in 
Tables 1 and 2. As can be seen, the correlations for international and inter-regional 
migration are positive and significant with respect to per capita GDP growth rate while 




























These enormous differences in the number of inter-regional and international 
migrants suggest that there might be a latent cost associated with crossing a border even 
in the absence of policy restrictions and significant lingual and socio-cultural barriers. 
Such a cost could be indicative of a ‘home bias’ for labor supply, just as there is 
evidence for home bias in goods, assets etc. Home bias can loosely be defined as an 
observed tendency of agents to disproportionately use goods, assets etc. belonging to 
their home country. Home bias for labor supply is hardly surprising as agents might 
prefer to remain in their country of residence and crossing borders may involve 
significant costs. This implies that the presence of home bias also raises the possibility of 
borders having an adverse effect on aggregate welfare. Moreover, if home bias does 
exist, ignoring it while modeling potential migration can lead to an overestimation of 
welfare gains as migrating across borders may involve a sizeable inherent cost.  
 
Correlation between 
 Net Log Growth Rate of Immigration and  Net Log Growth Rate of GDP per worker 
Denmark and Sweden 0.361* 
East Denmark and West Denmark 0.654** 
* significant at 10% 





This paper analyzes the difference between international and inter-regional 
migration in quantitative terms with the aid of a simple two-country dynamic general 
equilibrium model of migration and GDP driven by differences in exogenous 
productivity shocks. The model is first estimated for Denmark and Sweden and the 
results are compared with a similar analysis conducted for regions within Denmark. I 
find strong evidence for a significant cost associated with migrating across national 
borders. The cost of crossing an international border for the average migrant is almost 
double the corresponding cost of crossing a regional border. When considering the 
migration costs paid by the marginal mover, the evidence in support of border effects 
becomes even more apparent, particularly for old agents. Thus, borders do have a 
deleterious effect on welfare; the presence of a national border decreases welfare by 
about 0.15% of annual consumption. Ignoring such high border costs can result in an 
overestimation of the welfare from open borders by about 18% even for countries as 
similar as Denmark and Sweden. 
Number of Total Migrants as a Percent of Total Labor Force 
Denmark and Sweden 
0.0306 
(0.0018) 
East Denmark and West Denmark 
0.5841 
(0.0043) 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
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1.1 Related Literature 
 
This paper relates to international migration, regional migration and ‘home bias’ 
- three somewhat distinct strands of literature. Many papers that focus on international 
labor movements deal with migration from countries with low total factor productivities 
to countries with high total factor productivities. This paper on the other hand, studies 
labor migration across similar economies. In this respect, it is closer to papers that study 
regional migration within countries – in fact one of the models tested here pertains 
directly to regional migration. By using a common framework to analyze both regional 
and international migration, this paper estimates the effect of a national border on 
migration decisions. Thus it connects to the literature on home bias even though such a 
bias for labor supply is intuitive and easily explained as agents might prefer to remain in 
their home country and crossing borders could entail significant costs. Various papers 
have documented the home bias for goods, savings, assets etc. This paper too contributes 
to this literature by estimating a measure for home bias in labor by computing the 
difference between a regional border and a national border in the context of labor 
migration.  
 Among papers on international migration, Borjas (1995), Walmsley and Winters 
(2003) and Moses and Letnes (2004) quantify the effects of labor migration in a static 
setting. Urrutia (1998), Ben-Gad (2003) and Klein and Ventura (2006, 2007) examine 
mobility in a dynamic setting, as does this paper. However, these other papers study the 
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topic of migration across countries with different levels of Total Factor Productivity or 
development (or study only the inflow – such as Ben-Gad, 2003). These approaches 
provide a good insight into the economic costs of migration restrictions or the economic 
effects of actual migration, but do not provide much insight into how national borders 
differ from regional borders with respect to migration, the key question motivating this 
paper. 
Many of the important papers on regional migration use micro data and are hence 
able to identify demographic and other individual–level factors that play a role in the 
migration decisions of workers. Greenwood (1997) and Cushing and Poot (2004) 
provide a good survey of this literature. Kennan and Walker (2006) estimate a structural 
dynamic model to estimate moving costs and explain across-state migration decisions for 
agents in the United States. Another paper involving a structural microeconomic model 
is Bayer and Juessen (2006) in which, once again, the authors compute migration costs 
across US states.  Davies, Greenwood and Li (2001) also uncover inter-state migration 
costs for the US through an empirical study using a multinomial logit model. However 
none of these papers analyze international labor migration to explain how regional 
borders differ from international ones in terms of migration costs. 
Home bias too has been examined by a number of papers in various contexts. 
This paper is closest in spirit to Mc Callum (1996) who uncovers the home bias in trade 
by estimating the effect of a national border through a model in which the internal trade 
within US and Canada is compared to international trade between US and Canada. This 
12 
 
paper is similar since it compares internal migration within Denmark to international 
migration between Denmark and Sweden. Other approaches are adopted by Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980) who study the home bias in savings and French and Poterba (1991) 
who address the home bias in equity portfolios. 
The next section describes the data used to estimate the model. In Section III, I 
set up the model and discuss its theoretical features. I present the results of the 
estimation in Section IV and conclude the paper in Section V by discussing the results, 
conducting welfare analyses and other informative exercises; finally, I outline the 
avenues for possible future work on this topic. 
 
2 Examining the Data  
 
For this paper I use data from Statistics Denmark (international emigration and 
immigration, regional emigration and immigration, regional GDP) and OECD Statistics 
(Danish and Swedish National GDP and Labor Force). 
Denmark and Sweden present themselves as a great source of data to answer the 
question raised in this paper. As discussed in the previous section, Denmark and Sweden 
are both part of the Nordic Common Labor market established in 1954. However, 
Denmark and Sweden had already ratified the first Nordic Labor Market treaty eight 
years earlier, in 1946. Moreover, the Nordic Social Security Convention was signed in 
1955 to further promote migration by ensuring that Nordic governments treat immigrants 
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from other Nordic countries just like their own citizens in terms of social security. Thus, 
Nordic immigrants in any other Nordic country have free access to extended services in 
health and insurance as well as the same unemployment benefits and state pension as the 
corresponding Nordic citizens. Further, moving from one Nordic country to another does 
not affect the number of years of contribution to supplementary pension entitlements 
(Nord 1996:2, p 121). With all regulatory barriers removed1, the dataset can help isolate 
the cost of the border between Denmark and Sweden. 
Another advantage of choosing Denmark and Sweden for the data is that there is 
very little cross-border commuting between the two countries. Until the building of the 
Oresund Bridge in 2000, the only link between the countries was either by air or an 
almost hour-long journey by hovercraft. As much of the data used for this paper precedes 
the opening of the bridge, and as no structural break in the data was observed in 2000, 









To understand the cost of a border, it is essential to be able to compare it to the 
cost of moving in the absence of a border. For this, migration within Denmark can be 
conveniently used. Although Denmark was divided into numerous counties, in January 
2007, under the Danish Municipal Reform, five new administrative units were created to 
replace the country's traditional thirteen counties.  
In order to study inter-region migration using the same sparse model as the one 
used for inter-country migration, for the purpose of this paper, these five regions were 
further grouped into two larger regions - East Denmark (comprising Nordjylland, 
MidtjyJland and Syddanmark) and West Denmark (comprising Hovedstaden and 
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Sjaelland). As can be seen from the Danish map in Figure 4, this grouping of regions 
appears natural in terms of migration and geography. East and West Denmark are 
connected only at specific transit points with bridges (and ferries before the building of 
bridges such as the Great Belt Fixed Link in 1997 which connects South Denmark to 
Zealand). Again, this judicious choice of regions minimizes the number of possible 
commuters. Moreover even if inter-regional commuting is significantly under-measured 
in these data, it would bias results in favor of the principal argument of this paper. It 
would imply that agents are even more willing to cross regional borders as compared to 
national borders (across which commuting is not significant) and that would entail even 
larger differences between regional and international migration costs. 
All the migration data used in this paper are from the Central Population Register 
of Denmark. Illegal migration is not a concern for this choice of countries and this 
dataset. Moreover, rather than estimations from samples, the data uses the true 
population values. Also, since the same data source is used for both regional and 
international migration, the definitions are standard and the data are comparable with 
each other. 
One feature that stands out in the data is that young people tend to migrate much 
more than older people. As can be seen in Figure 5 and 6, this is consistently true both in 




To include this feature in the analysis while retaining a sparse model, the 
population of each country (and region) was divided into two groups - young and old. 
Those below 35 years of age were assumed to be young and those above were assumed 
to be old. 35 was chosen as a cut-off since for both Denmark-Sweden migration and for 
East-West migration, no five year aggregation of ages above 35 accounted for more than 





















As can be seen in Figures 7 and 8, there continues to be a significant correlation 
between the migration of young people and GDP per worker just as there was for overall 
migration and GDP per worker in Figures 1 and 2. And again, as with Figure 3, the huge 
difference in the percent of inter-regional movers and international movers persists for 
both groupings of age. This can be seen in Figures 9 and 10. Also, it can be noted by 
comparing across the two graphs that the percent of old movers for both international 
migration and inter-regional migration is considerably less than the corresponding 
























































































































































Another interesting feature of the data is the high proportion of 'reverse migrants'. 
Reverse migrants can be defined as the movers from a country experiencing a relative 
economic boom to the other country. Despite the significant correlation between GDP 
growth and Migration growth, a large number of migrants each period move in the 
counter-intuitive direction. This finding is consistent for both Denmark-Sweden 
migration and East-West migration. Table 3 shows that for both international and inter-
region data, the fraction of migrants who are reverse migrants is very high (greater than 
0.4) and the standard deviation for this fraction is also very low. Any model that aims to 
explain migration should be able to accommodate this finding as well. 
 
 
3 Model  
 
The data is analyzed using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model 
with a continuum of old and young agents who are heterogeneous in terms of their 
Fraction of Migrants who are ‘Reverse Migrants’ 
Denmark and Sweden 
0.4364 
(0.0097) 
East Denmark and West Denmark 
0.4599 
(0.0053) 




realized moving cost each period. As the question is specifically targeted towards 
migration, a two-country setting was deemed appropriate. A general equilibrium 
framework is useful for estimating the overall cost of moving across a border. While a 
static framework can provide intuition, a dynamic model is required to properly estimate 
moving costs as the former cannot capture the differences between the response of 
migration to transient and persistent shocks to TFP. In the model, the only source of 
aggregate uncertainty is the TFP shock. Each period, every agent faces an idiosyncratic 
moving shock and an idiosyncratic aging shock, but as the distributions of these shocks 
are invariant over time and as there is a continuum of agents densely populated over both 
distributions (for the moving shocks and age), these do not lead to any aggregate 
uncertainty. Labor is the only input required for production, there is no storage 
technology and savings are possible only through Arrow Securities. 
The model is first estimated with Denmark and Sweden as the two economies 
and then estimated again with East and West Denmark as the two economies. The 




As the data shows distinct age effects, the model too allows for two types of 
agents - young and old. The essential features of age effects can be captured with just 
two types of agents and allowing more types will reduce the sparseness of the model. For 
22 
 
ease of computation, all agents are assumed to be infinitely lived and age in a Markov 
fashion - young agents get old with a certain probability (1-α) each period and old agents 
die with a certain probability (1-π) each period. Old Agents who die are replaced by an 
identical number of young agents who receive all the bequests of the old agents. As with 
standard infinitely lived agent models, agents in this model too are perfectly benevolent 
across generations. The total population size as well as the distribution of ages is 
assumed to be constant over time. In other words, the number of young people who 
become old each period is equal to the number of old people dying and getting replaced 




Agents have time separable, constant relative risk aversion preferences over a 
composite good that includes the consumption good, possible disutility from moving and 
disutility from labor. In an alternate and mathematically equivalent specification, the 
composite good consists only of the consumption good and disutility from labor, while 
the moving cost is paid in the form of resources in the budget constraint. Although 
mathematically equivalent, the two specifications are not observationally equivalent as 




The instantaneous utility is given by the function below. Depending on the 
variation considered, C could include just resources or a combination of resources and 
disutility from moving as discussed below. n is the labor supplied while ω is 1+ the 
inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of labor substitution and γ is the coefficient of 







CRRA preferences with the composite good comprising the consumption good and 
disutility from labor are common in the Business Cycle literature (see for instance, 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Greenwood et al. (1988) for examples). A case 
could be made for including the moving cost in the utility function as people may prefer 
to stay in one country rather than another and this may be the underlying reason for the 
moving cost. Alternatively, it could be argued that the moving cost is caused by an actual 
depletion of resources incurred while moving. As shown later in this section both can be 
considered equivalent as long as the specification for preferences involves the moving 





3.3 Production Technology 
 
Each country has a perfectly competitive representative firm that maximizes 
profits by choosing the amount of labor to hire while producing with the following 





     
       
       
         
 
The firm’s problem is trivial and its solution yields that the wage rate in a country is 
equal to the TFP of the country. 
 
3.4 Moving Cost 
 
All agents are identical except for their age, location and moving cost. Agents 
have an age-dependent fixed component in their moving cost - 'a' for young agents and 
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'a+b' for old agents. Every period, each agent realizes an idiosyncratic moving shock - a 
random term denoted by 'ξ' that adds to (or subtracts from) the age-dependent component 
of their moving cost. Based on their location and their realized total moving cost, the 
agents decide whether to migrate and suffer the moving cost or remain in their country of 
residence.  
The total moving cost faced by an agent can be expressed as shown: 
′ · ·  
Where: 
′     ,      
  ′  1          ′     
              
               
       1     
       ,         0     
  The moving cost distribution can be explained thus: an agent's moving cost 
depends primarily on her age. The age-dependent component of the moving cost is fixed 
and identical for all agents of the same age. At the start of each period an agent realizes 
an idiosyncratic moving shock denoted by ‘ξ’. A low ‘ξ’ could be associated with a 
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willingness to migrate - possibly due to family or personal life events such as graduation 
etc. A very negative ‘ξ’ such that the total moving cost for an agent is also negative (ξ < 
- a for young agents and ξ < - (a+b) for old agents) can be explained as a desire to move 
to the other location - for some reason, the agent would rather stay in the other location 
than in her current location. As the model does not distinguish between return migrants 
and migrants (once an agent moves to a location, she is assumed to belong to her 
location of residence), the negative moving costs could also be agents desiring to return 
to their home locations. A logistic distribution is assumed for the moving shock as it 
approximates the normal distribution and at the same is analytical tractable and can be 
described sparsely with just two parameters.  
It can be shown that having costs of the specified form in the utility function is 
equivalent to having the costs in the resource constraint. 
3.4.1 Equivalence between Moving Cost in Preferences and Moving Cost in Budget 
Constraint 
 
Consider a static one-period problem faced by a young agent  
max
, ′,
′ · ,  
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. .  C+| ′| · · 1 ′ · · ′ ·  
 . .  · 1 ′ · · ′ · | ′| ·  
The former specification includes the moving cost in preferences, while the latter 
equivalent specification has the moving cost in the resource constraint. It should be 
noted that the value of consumption in the latter case includes the factor for the moving 
cost. Also, for both these problems, it is assumed that the agent solves for G, l and n or 
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C, l and n simultaneously because the choice of location will have an impact on the 
choice of G or C and n. Essentially, the agent solves for what she would have consumed 
(G or C) and what would have been her labor supply (n) for each possible country of 
choice and then picks the country and the corresponding G (or C) and n based on the 
option that results in greater utility. In the above format, the discrete choice nature of the 
problem may not be immediately apparent as all the optimizations are embedded within 
the same maximization problem. 
While solving the above model, for ease of computation, it will be assumed that 
the moving cost is in the resource constraint while keeping in mind that if the definition 
of consumption is suitably modified to include moving costs, the results will also hold 
for moving costs of the specified form in the utility function. 
3.5 Timing 
 
The sequence of events is as shown on the time line in Figure 11. It should be 
noted here that agents can make the migration decision in the same period that they 
realize their TFP and moving shock. Hence, each period, agents can migrate between the 
two countries to exploit the TFP differential. In quarterly models, often a lag is assumed 
- i.e. capital or labor cannot be relocated until the next period. In an annual model, this 
seems less reasonable - migrants can and do respond contemporaneously to differences 












3.6 Planner’s Dynamic Programming Problem 
 
 
Assuming complete markets, perfect insurance, perfect information and no 
externalities, the decentralized problem can be rewritten as a planner’s problem. 
Essentially, each agent is able to eliminate the idiosyncratic risks associated with aging, 
moving shocks and the insurable portion of the aggregate TFP. The only source of 
uncertainty after insurance is the aggregate shock. With complete markets the only 
difference between agents will be their location, age and moving shock. Thus in each 































that agents with a moving shock below their respective cutoffs will migrate to the other 
country. In the planner's problem too, the benevolent social planner can assign the same 
cutoffs and move the agents with lower moving costs as well as decide leisure and 
consumption of all agents. 
The planner’s state variables are Z (vector of TFPs), L (vector indicating the 
number of young agents in country one and country 2) and H (vector indicating the 
number of old agents in country 1 and country 2). The planner’s decision variables are 
the four cutoffs for migration (as there is also reverse migration each period) and the 
consumption and labor allocations to agents in each country. The planner weights each 
agent identically. Also, the consumption and labor decision of each agent within a 
country is the same (planner does not discriminate between them, or more intuitively, in 
the decentralized version, agents within a country are identical as they have insured 
away all the idiosyncratic shocks relating to age and moving costs). Output can be 
costlessly shipped from one location to another 
 
The Planner’s Problem can be written as shown below: 
 
, , max











 ′  ′, ′, ′  
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Where  
ξ*i,j is the cutoff moving shock for agents in country i and of type j – agents below this 
level of moving shock will migrate to the other country in the same period 
Ci is the consumption of an agent in country i after migration has taken place 
ni is the labor supplied by an agent in country i after migration has taken place 
Ni is the total number of agents in country i after migration and age change has taken 
place, that is, Ni=L’i + H’i 
The first two terms in the resource constraints are the aggregate consumptions in country 
1 and 2 respectively. The next two terms are the aggregate productions in the two 
countries respectively. Finally, the term in the square brackets is the aggregate moving 
cost. In the expression for the moving cost, f(x) is the probability density function of the 
logistic distribution and a+x is the cost paid by a young mover who has realized a shock 
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of x while a+b+x is the corresponding cost for an old mover. Everyone with a moving 
shock less than their respective cutoff ξ* (based on age and location) is made to move 
and there are L1 young movers in country 1 (and so on…). So the total resource cost of 
moving can be obtained by integrating over the cost suffered by movers of both types in 
both countries. 
The evolution of the age distributions is given by: 
′ · , · , 1 · , · ,  
′ · , · , 1 · , · ,  
′ 1 · , · , · , · ,  
′ 1 · , · , · , · ,  
 
Where F is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution and Li and Hi are 
the number of young and old people in country i respectively. 
At the start of each period, country 1 has L1 young people. Once migration occurs, the 
number of young people decreases by the number of emigrants and increases by the 
number of immigrants. The number of young emigrants is [L1·F(ξ*1,L) ] as everyone with 
a migration cost less than the cutoff, given age and location, emigrate. Similarly, the 
number of young immigrants is [L2·F(ξ*2,L) ]. Thus, after migration and before aging, the 
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number of young people in country 1 is given by · , · , . 
Similarly, the number of old people in country 1 after migration and before aging is 
· , · , . Upon the realization of the aging shock, α fraction 
of the young people stays young while a 1-π fraction of the old people are replaced by 
young agents. Thus the number of young people in country 1 at the start of the next 
period is given by  
′ · , · , 1 · , · , . 
The equations for the remaining age distribution terms are obtained similarly. 
 
Also, the age distribution and population size are assumed to be invariant while solving 
the dynamic problem: 
L1 + L2= L’1 + L’2   = L (the number of people who are young in the total population) 
H1 + H2=H’1 + H’2   = L (the number of people who are old in the total population) 
Figure 12 shows the time invariant logistic distribution of moving shocks as seen 
by the planner. The cost of moving every young agent below a certain cut-off (for 
instance, -2 as in Figure 12) is given by the equation below assuming that the population 
of young agents is 1. For any other population size, the cost would be multiplied by the 
size. 
         2    ∞   
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Figure 13 shows the cost of moving as the fraction of people moved increases, 
assuming a total population of 1. As can be seen, if no one moves the aggregate moving 
cost is 0. However, as the planner starts moving agents with negative moving costs 
(since their moving shocks are very negative, i.e. ξ <-a) the aggregate moving cost is 
also negative. The aggregate moving cost continues to fall as long as the agents who are 
being moved have negative total moving costs. However, as the fraction of population 
migrating increases, now agents with positive moving costs also have to move. This 
begins to increase the moving cost until the moving cost soon becomes positive. Finally, 
as all agents are moved, the aggregate moving cost approaches the no-shock moving cost 
since the mean of ξ =0. A very high value of variance was used to construct Figures 12 
and 13 to clearly illustrate negative aggregate moving costs - a feature essential to 





In fact, Figure 14 illustrates a simple static example of migration. Assuming that 
the home country has a TFP of 1, it shows who migrates and who doesn't for a range of 
foreign country TFPs and total moving costs for an agent. When home TFP is equal to 
foreign TFP, an agent with zero total moving costs is indifferent between moving and 
staying. So, all agents with costs higher than 0 do not move while all agents with costs 
lower than zero do move. However, as the TFP in the foreign country rises, agents with 


















Agents with sufficiently negative moving costs will migrate to the other country even 
when the TFP in the other country is the same or lower. 
From Figure 14, it can be seen that this model can address the main features of 
the data - migration correlated to GDP while there are also reverse migrants each period. 
Also, a moving cost higher for international migration than for inter-region migration 






4 Calibration and Solution Techniques 
 
Three commonly used parameters needed for this model are β (the discount rate), 
ω (1+the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of labor substitution) and γ (the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion). For these parameters I use standard RBC values 




The parameters relating to the TFP process were estimated directly from the data. 
Using the production equation in the model and estimates of labor supply within 
Denmark and across Denmark and Sweden, TFPs were backed out and regressed to get 
estimates of the required parameters. The TFPs obtained are approximate as capital was 
not included while obtaining estimates. However, this was not deemed to be much of a 
concern as capital does not usually vary much cyclically. The spillover of the TFP 
Standard Parameters used for Calibration 
ω (1 + inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor 
supply) 
1.455 
γ (the coefficient of relative risk aversion) 2 
β (the annual discount rate) 0.96 
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process was not significantly different from zero for either case, hence it was assumed to 
be 0. The persistence parameter on the other hand was significantly positive and with a 
smaller standard error. Hence 'p' the persistence parameter was estimated directly. 
Similarly the correlation and variance of technology shocks were also estimated directly 
from the data using the error terms in the TFP regressions mentioned above. The 
correlation for East and West Denmark was high as was than the correlation for 
Denmark and Sweden indicating that the economies are closely tied. As can be expected, 
the correlation is higher for East and West Denmark. The estimate for the probability for 
staying young α and the probability for staying old π come directly from the assumption 
that the expected duration of youth is 20 years and the expected duration of old age is 30 
years. These parameters are listed in Table 5. 
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Parameters estimated directly from data 
 Denmark-Sweden East-West Denmark 
p (persistence in VAR process for 
TFP) 
0.7259 0.7438 
ρ (x, y) (correlation of innovation 
shock) 
0.2642 0.2824 
σ (x, x) (variance of innovation 
shock) 
3.94e-04 1.47e-04 
α (probability of staying young) 0.95 0.95 
π (probability of staying old) 0.97 0.97 
Table 5 
 
The remaining parameters of the model were estimated by matching moments 
using the Method of Simulated Moments within a value function iteration structure. In 
order to use the technique of dynamic programming, the TFP process had to be 
discretized. Unfortunately the analytical method suggested by Tauchen and Hussey 
(1991) for converting a VAR to a Markov process could not be used due to the 
significant cross correlation of the shocks or error terms in the VAR. A numerical 
method was used instead and data were simulated to compare results with the true VAR. 
The numerical method involved simulating data from the VAR and computing equal 
areas as with quadrature methods to find nodes and then computing transition 
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probabilities from node to node. The process was repeated in a Monte Carlo setting 
numerous times until the standard errors of the estimates were small.  
The remaining variables in the state space had to be discretized as well - the 
combined TFP process was discretized into 25 points while 35 points were chosen for 
each endogenous state variable resulting in a total grid size of 30625 points.  
The data moments used for the simulated method of moments and the 
corresponding model moments are shown in Tables 6 and 7. As the model was over-
identified, it could be tested for the identifying restrictions using the two-step method - 
by first estimating the optimal weighting matrix and then estimating the parameters 
again by matching moments. The fitness of the over-identification restrictions was 
rejected for both Denmark-Sweden and East-West Denmark as the J statistic was greater 
than the critical value of the chi square distribution for all levels of confidence. 
Moments that were matched (Denmark – Sweden) 
 Data Model 
Number of total migrants as a percent of labor force 0.031 0.032 
Fraction of migrants who are ‘Reverse Migrants’ 0.436 0.431 
Number of young migrants as a percent of labor force 0.020 0.028 






Moments that were matched (East – West Denmark) 
 Data Model 
Number of total migrants as a percent of labor force 0.584 0.586 
Fraction of migrants who are ‘Reverse Migrants’ 0.460 0.458 
Number of young migrants as a percent of labor force 0.468 0.466 
Covariance of young migrants to old migrants 0.273 0.274 
 
Table 7 
The model was then estimated numerous times using a Monte Carlo approach 
and the resulting parameters and corresponding standard errors are reported in Table 8. 
While the implications of these numbers will be elaborated upon in the next section, it is 
interesting to note that the numbers for migration with Denmark and Sweden are similar 
to those obtained by Kennan and Walker (2006) in their US inter-state migration model 




Main Parameters Estimated 
 Denmark – 
Sweden  
East – West Denmark 















Standard errors are in parentheses   
Table 8 
 
Kennan and Walker Moving Costs (Two – Type Model) 
 Moving Cost 
 (in terms of 2005 US 
dollars) 
Moving Cost  
(in terms of per capita GDP) 
Average Mover 176,157 4.21 
Mover to Previous Location 58,911 1.41 





Table 9  
 
The results in Kennan and Walker (2006) are similar to the costs of inter-regional 
migration within Denmark. Their models however include numerous factors such as 
distance of move and whether the migrant is a return migrant etc. Thus they obtain a 
range of moving costs – the results shown in the Table above are the ones they choose to 
present in their paper.  
 
5 Results and Implications 
 
The border effect is highlighted in Tables 10, 11 and 12. The numbers in Table 
10 reflect the average over the entire population and include both, the actual moving cost 
for movers and the potential moving cost for non-movers. While the cost for internal 
migration in Denmark is similar to that for internal migration in the US as measured by 
Kennan and Walker (2006), international migration is much costlier. For both young and 
old agents, the mean moving cost for crossing a national border is almost twice as much 
as that for crossing a regional border. In terms of variance, there is a higher variance of 
the moving shock for international migrants.  
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Average Total Moving Costs for Agents 
includes actual costs borne by movers as well as potential costs faced by non-movers 
 (in terms of annual per capita GDP) 
 Denmark-Sweden East-West Denmark 
a (moving cost for young people) 7.5256 3.9865 
a + b (moving cost for old people) 11.0019 5.7955 
 
Table 10 
Table 11 compares average inter-regional and international moving costs actually 
paid by young and old agents who migrate despite facing a positive moving cost. Young 
agents who choose to move across national borders typically suffer twice the cost as 
compared to similar agents who choose to move across regional borders. For old agents, 
the difference is even greater – with international movers bearing about four times the 
cost paid by domestic movers. The numbers in Table 11 are much smaller than those in 
Table 10 because the former considers actual movers (typically, a very small fraction of 
the population) and the latter considers all agents – movers and non-movers. Those who 
do move have extremely low realizations of the moving shocks (ξ) compared to the 




Mean of Moving Costs actually paid by agents who migrate despite facing a positive 
moving cost 
 (averaged over different realizations of TFP and in terms of annual per capita GDP) 
 Denmark-Sweden East-West Denmark 
moving cost for young people 0.0320 0.0157 
moving cost for old people 0.6251 0.1472 
 
Table 11 
Another way to consider the impact of the border is to examine the cost faced by 
the marginal mover. Every period, only those with low total moving costs move. The 
marginal mover in any period can be described as the individual whose moving cost is 
such that he is exactly indifferent between moving and not moving. The marginal mover 
has a low total moving cost because he usually has a strongly negative moving shock ξ. 
In any given period, those with moving costs greater than the marginal mover for that 
period do not migrate. Thus the highest cost actually paid by a migrant in any period 
cannot exceed the cost faced by the marginal mover for that period. The results for the 
marginal mover indicate that averaged over different realizations of TFP, a young 
marginal mover pays a cost of only 3% of GDP per capita in order to move from one 
region to another and 6% of GDP per capita to move from one country to another. 
Similarly, averaged over different realizations of TFP, old marginal movers pay a cost of 
1.2 times GDP per capita while moving across international borders and about 30% of 
GDP per capita while moving across regions in Denmark. It can be seen therefore that 
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the marginal young migrant crossing a regional border faces less than half the cost when 
compared to the marginal young mover crossing a national border.  For old marginal 
movers, the difference is even more marked - with those crossing national borders 
paying almost four times as much as those crossing regional borders.  
Moving Cost faced by marginal mover who is indifferent between migrating and not 
migrating 
 (averaged over different realizations of TFP and in terms of annual per capita GDP) 
 Denmark-Sweden East-West Denmark 
moving cost for young marginal 
mover 
0.0639 0.0314 





These numbers indicate a clear and significant border effect in labor supply. 
Despite there being no policy restrictions on migration between Denmark and Sweden 
and despite the similarity of the two countries, Danish residents face a much higher cost 
for moving across national borders than they do for moving across regional borders. 
While the characteristics of the cost associated with moving across borders are 
interesting in and of themselves, they also have far reaching economic implications. One 
interesting counterfactual experiment to understand the importance of the border effect is 
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to analyze what would happen if the moving costs across the two countries were to be 
the same as inter-regional moving costs. For computing welfare, the magnitude of the 
planner's value function is compared across the two specifications. In the former 
specification, the international border has its true cost and in the latter, its cost is 
counterfactually assumed to be equal to that of regional borders. The welfare gain is 
obtained as the amount by which annual consumption would have to increase each 
period for the two value functions to be equal. Denmark and Sweden would enjoy a 
welfare gain of about 0.15% if the national moving costs across the two countries were 
to mirror the moving costs across Danish regions. This number is significant from the 
standpoint of business cycle studies. For instance, when constant relative risk aversion is 
2, the cost of business cycles using the framework in Lucas (1987) is 0.016% for the US. 
However, it should be noted that the high number in this paper could include both the 
psychic cost of moving and the resource cost of moving as the model does not explicitly 
distinguish between the two.  
As Denmark and Sweden have actively implemented numerous policies to 
facilitate easy migration, it is doubtful whether this moving cost can be changed 
substantially with further policies. Moreover, despite their numerous differences 
Denmark and Sweden are quite similar in terms of language, culture, heritage etc. Hence 
this loss in welfare reflects a good estimate of the true cost of having a national border, 




In the literature, papers such as Klein and Ventura (2004, 2005), Moses and 
Letnes (2004), Walmsey and Winters (2003) and many others measure the importance of 
migration by estimating the potential welfare gain from the hypothetical opening of 
borders across countries where borders are currently closed in reality.  The model and 
data of this paper on the other hand can be used to compute the importance of migration 
by using a converse approach. How much is the improvement in welfare due to the 
borders being open as they are in reality when compared to a hypothetical alternative 
scenario with closed borders? 
 Accordingly, in a second counterfactual experiment, welfare was analyzed for 
Denmark and Sweden assuming a closed border. Next, welfare was calculated again - 
now with the border open and true international moving costs. Finally welfare was 
calculated a third time - this time assuming open borders again but with moving costs 
across Denmark and Sweden assumed to be the same as for regions within Denmark. As 
can be seen in Table 13, the true welfare gains from open borders are 0.67%. If national 
border effects had been ignored, the welfare gains from open borders would have been 
computed as 0.82% thereby overestimating the benefits of open borders by about 18%. 
This suggests that models of potential migration across currently closed borders should 
seriously consider including border effects for labor supply or risk greatly overestimating 
the gains from open borders. Crossing a national border involves significantly higher 
costs than crossing a regional border, even when migration is perfectly legal and 




Welfare gain due to open borders estimated while including the effect of national 
borders 
0.67% 
Welfare gain due to open borders estimated while ignoring the effect of national 
borders 
0.82% 




5.1 The Road Ahead and Future Work  
 
One natural and straightforward extension of this paper would be to use the 
model presented here to simulate data and compare directly to micro data and models. 
Another would be to consider a three-region model to include considerations of inter-
region and international labor migration within the same setup. A third addition could be 
to apply the estimates from the model for numerous bordering countries that do not 
allow international migration. Thus by considering their joint TFP processes and 
potential migrations predicted with this model, good estimates of aggregate welfare 
gains from opening up borders can be obtained. 
The method used to analyze the cost of border in terms of labor mobility can also 
be extended easily to include other Nordic countries right away as well as various EU 
countries once more data becomes available for them. Using such an approach, the effect 
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of other national characteristics on migration costs can be estimated as well. For 
instance, Finland is part of the common Nordic Labor Market but Finnish is a very 
different language from Danish, Swedish and Norwegian. Studying the same question 
while looking at Finland as well as Denmark, Sweden and Norway can shed some light 
on the impact of language on migration costs. A common cost of migration present in 
other models that has been omitted in this paper (largely because that cost is theoretically 
similar whether the migration is across regions or nations) is the impact of a fixed factor 
of production such as land. If land is included explicitly in the model, better estimates of 
the consequences of neglecting the effect of national borders can be obtained and these 
estimates can be applied directly to numerous papers that include land in their analysis 




The Macroeconomic Impact of Migrant Remittances in an 
Overlapping-Generations Model 
 
This chapter studies the impact of migrant remittances on welfare, consumption, 
savings and the structure of production between traded and non-traded sectors in both the 
remittance sending and the remittance receiving countries. Micro foundations are used to 
model remittances explicitly in an overlapping-generations framework where 
remittances are driven entirely by the savings decisions of migrants who return to their 
home country upon retirement. Data from South Africa and Lesotho are used to calibrate 
the model. The results show that remittances are influenced by the economic prospects in 
the host country. Restricting migration reduces both home country and aggregate welfare 
although remittances have an impact on the real exchange rate and the structure of 
production in the recipient country in accordance with the phenomenon known as ‘Dutch 
Disease.’ A counterfactual exercise using the model solution demonstrates that citizens 
of the host country would suffer a welfare loss of 1.2% if it were to choose assisting the 




 The magnitude of migrant remittances has increased tremendously in recent 
years. According to World Bank estimates, developing countries received 240 Billion 
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US Dollars worth of remittances from migrants in 20072. Thus, remittances have become 
an increasingly important area of research in recent years. 
 
 Empirical literature on remittances suggests that their volume is influenced by 
aggregate variables in both, sending and receiving countries. Papers that study recipient 
country effects include Chami et al (2003) who find remittances to be countercyclical, 
and Giuliano and Ruiz-Aranz (2006) who find them to be procyclical. Vargas-Silva and 
Huang (2005) study both host (sending) and home (receiving) country effects and they 
conclude that remittances depend more strongly on the sending country’s aggregate 
variables.  
 
At the same time, due to their large magnitude, remittances also have significant 
consequences for recipient economies. Many papers in the literature study the impact of 
migrant remittances on various relevant macroeconomic variables such as welfare, the 
structure of production and the real exchange rate. One issue that has received 
considerable attention is the role played by remittances in causing a phenomenon known 
as ‘Dutch Disease.’ In the words of Acosta et al (2007): 
The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was originally used to describe the difficulties 
faced by manufacturing in the Netherlands following the development of 
natural gas on a large scale which triggered a major appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. It has since been used to refer to any situation in 
                                                            
2 Source: World Bank: http://go.worldbank.org/QOWEWD6TA0 (World Bank, 2008) 
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which a natural resource boom, or large foreign aid, or capital inflows, 
cause real appreciation and jeopardizes the prospects of the tradable 
sector. 
 
Therefore, a model with two sectors (traded and non-traded goods) is required in 
order to study the macroeconomic impact of remittances while allowing for Dutch 
Disease effects. Moreover, since both host and home country macroeconomic variables 
are empirically seen to be relevant, the model should also feature both countries. 
Although various motives for remittances have been proposed and studied, this chapter 
assumes that all remittances are driven by the savings motive of migrants who relocate to 
their home country upon retirement (an alternative framework involving familial 
altruism is considered in the next chapter). Thus, the model also needs at least two 
generations, one working and the other retired. All these features are included in a 
parsimonious, deterministic, general equilibrium overlapping-generations model 
involving two countries (home or remittance receiving country and host or remittance 
sending country), two sectors (traded and non-traded) and agents who live for two 
periods (working and retirement) each.  
  
 South Africa and Lesotho were chosen for this study because sector level GDP 
and remittance data are readily available for the pair and almost all of the remittances 
55 
 
(84%, according to World Bank sources3) into Lesotho come from South Africa. Thus, 
ignoring the presence of other countries in the model should not affect the findings 
significantly.  
The model is parameterized using various features of the data. The model’s 
solution suggests that remittances are welfare enhancing despite their adverse impact on 
the real exchange rate and their contribution to the phenomenon of Dutch Disease. 
Aggregate welfare decreases when migration is decreased because restricting migration 
greatly reduces home country welfare even though they marginally improve host country 
welfare. The host country gains higher welfare by allowing migration from the home 
country rather than providing it equivalent foreign aid. 
 
1.1 Related Literature 
 
  For detailed surveys of the literature please refer to Page and Plaza 
(2006), Rapoport and Docquier (2005) and Loser et al (2006). Although most papers on 
remittances have a microeconomic focus, there are some informative papers that adopt a 
macroeconomic perspective. Giuliano and Ruiz-Aranz (2006) conduct an empirical 
study and find that remittances lead to growth. Other empirical papers include Bourdet 
and Flack (2006) as well as Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), both of which show that 
remittances cause Dutch Disease. McComick and Wahba (2000) is a theoretical paper 
that studies a model involving two countries, two sectors and two skill levels of labor 
                                                            
3 Source: World Bank: http://go.worldbank.org/ U4RXL56V20 (World Bank, 2008) 
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supply to study the causes and consequences of migration and remittances. Papers that 
solve macroeconomic models and are closely related to this chapter include Chami et al 
(2006) and Acosta et al (2007). 
 
Chami et al (2006) do not consider Dutch Disease effects while Acosta et al 
(2007) focus primarily on this issue. However, both these papers ignore the role played 
by the macroeconomic variables of the remittance sending country. Rather than model 
remittance decisions explicitly, they assume an exogenous process for remittances. In the 
former paper, remittances are assumed to be countercyclical, while the latter considers 
acyclical, procyclical and countercyclical remittances in three separate scenarios. This 
paper adds to the current literature on the macroeconomics of remittances by solving a 
structural model that includes host and home country effects explicitly and treats 
remittances as an endogenous variable determined through micro foundations. The next 
section examines the data, section three presents the model and section four provides 
details regarding the calibration. The results and implications of the model are discussed 
in the fifth section which is followed by a brief exploration of possible future work. 
 
2 Examining the Data  
 The data used for this exercise are from Lesotho and South Africa. Although 
Lesotho is much less developed than South Africa, both economies can be considered to 
belong to the ‘Global South’ and according to Ratha and Shaw (2007), South-South 
remittances are very important economically (amounting to almost 20% of all inward 
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remittances to developing countries) warranting the need for detailed studies in the area. 
This is particularly true for Lesotho which receives annual remittances that amount to 
almost 25% of its total GDP. Moreover, in the context of the model being considered 
these two economies form a good country pair as almost all (84%)4 of Lesotho's inward 
remittances come from South Africa. At the same time, a significant fraction (70%)5 of 
South Africa’s outward remittances goes to Lesotho. Thus ignoring the influence of 
other countries can be somewhat justified for a model of remittances between South 
Africa and Lesotho, especially from the perspective of Lesotho (the 'home economy' and 
the country of focus in this paper).  
 
 Lesotho is a small, landlocked, mountainous country surrounded on all sides by 
South Africa. 
                                                            






A significant fraction (20% of the labor force)6 of working age Basotho find 
employment in South Africa. Mining is the predominant occupation (68%) of these 
Basotho migrants according to UN-INSTRAW and SAIIA (2007). Further, in Migration 
Policy Series (#2, 1997) of the South Africa Migration Project, Sechaba Consultants 
report that more than 70% of Basotho miners prefer to return to Lesotho rather than stay 
on in South Africa after the duration of their employment. These facts support the 
proposed two-country overlapping-generations model where migrants return to their 
home country upon retirement.  
 
 As can be seen from Figure 2, data from the national accounts of Lesotho and 
South Africa suggest that to a significant extent, the two economies share the same 
                                                            
6 Source: Global Policy Network: http://www.gpn.org/ (Global Policy Network, 2006) 
59 
 
business cycle. Remittances to Lesotho too are positively and strongly correlated to this 
cycle. This could be considered as supporting the findings of Vargas-Silva and Huang 
(2005) who report that remittances depend more strongly on the sending countries 
economic circumstances. Alternatively, the figure could be used to support the 
hypothesis that remittances are procyclical with the recipient country's economy because 










Since Lesotho and South Africa appear to be on almost the same business cycle, 
it is hard to disentangle the two possibilities by looking cursorily at the data. The 
correlations reported in Table 1 verify these co-movements. The growth rate of 
remittances is positively and significantly correlated with the per capita real GDP growth 
of both Lesotho and South Africa. Although the value of this correlation is higher for 

























































growth rate of SA per capita real GDP
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Selected Correlations from the Data 
Growth rate of South Africa per capita real GDP - Growth rate of Lesotho 
per capita real GDP 0.92* 
Growth rate of Lesotho per capita real GDP - Growth rate of real per 
capita remittances 0.86* 
Growth rate of South Africa per capita real GDP -  Growth rate of real per 
capita remittances 0.69* 
Growth rate of real exchange rate -  Growth rate of real per capita 
remittances 0.74 
Growth rate of real per capita non-traded output -  Growth rate of real per 
capita remittances 0.70* 
Growth rate of real per capita traded output -  Growth rate of real per 
capita remittances 0.73* 
* significant at 95% level 
Table 1 
 
The data can also be analyzed to find whether remittances cause Dutch Disease in 
Lesotho. In terms of exchange rates, the data is unambiguous. As can be seen in Figure 3 
and Table 1, the growth rate of remittances is correlated with the growth rate of the real 
exchange rate (the correlation is not significant even at the 90% level probably due to the 
short length of the series for the real exchange rate). In this paper, real exchange rate is 
defined as the price of one unit of the composite South African good in terms of the 
composite Lesotho good. Thus, according to Figure 3, as remittances increase, it takes a 
greater number of composite Lesotho goods to buy 1 composite South African good 








Another way to test for the presence of Dutch Disease is by studying the 
correlation between the non-traded goods sector and remittances. Figure 4 suggests that 
as remittances increase, so does the output of the non-traded goods sector, suggesting the 
presence of Dutch Disease. This can also be seen from the high correlation between the 
growth rate of real per capita non-traded output and the growth rate of real per capita 
remittances in Table 1. However, at the same time, it can be seen that remittances are 
also strongly correlated to the traded goods sector. Once again, while both correlations 
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from each other. Therefore, these sectoral analyses fail to provide any conclusive 




In order to obtain a better understanding of remittances, a structural model is set 
up and solved in the following sections. 
 
3 Model  
 
 The data are analyzed using a two-country, two-sector, general equilibrium, 
overlapping-generations model with agents who live for two periods (youth and 
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migrants in the foreign country. Remittances in this model take the form of the savings 
made by these young migrants who relocate to their home country upon retiring. Two 
countries are considered in order to capture home and host country effects in explicitly 
modeled remittance decisions. Two sectors are also necessary in order to study the issue 
of Dutch Disease. The model abstracts away from capital accumulation decisions and 
young agents can save for retirement only by purchasing land (a productive asset that 
yields rent) in their home country using traded goods (the only commodity in the 
economy that can cross borders). This is broadly consistent with the idea that ultimately 
all foreign aid, remittances and other international transfers involve the flow of tradable 
goods since non-traded goods cannot cross borders. Another important aspect of this 
model is that the resources in both economies stay fixed as capital accumulation is 
ignored. Host country residents are therefore unable to adjust to increases in migration 
by increasing their level of capital. Hence this model solution suggests an upper bound 
for the welfare loss experienced by the host country due to migration. This feature of the 
model is useful for some of the welfare studies performed later in the paper. Moreover 
the presence of an immobile factor of production for tradable goods guarantees that both 
countries manufacture both kinds of goods. 
One of the major limitations of this model is that agents live only for two periods. 
Although two periods can adequately describe the work-retirement effects the model 
seeks to capture, more periods could have mirrored actual demographic details better. 
However, increasing the number of periods in the life of each agent caused 
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computational difficulties, probably due to the presence of multiple equilibria in multi-
sector OLG models. For a detailed discussion of this issue, please refer to Galor (1992). 
With two-period lived agents however no problems were encountered during 
computation. In fact, even a dynamic, stochastic version of the two-period model was 
solved. But this model was difficult to calibrate as each period in an agent's life is 
equivalent to half an adult life time and the span of available time series data (10 years 
for most variables and even less for others) was inadequate for the exercise. Thus, a 
steady state version of the model was solved and calibrated in terms of key ratios 




 All agents in the model live for two periods each. At any given time there are two 
generations: 
• The working generation - each member of this generation is endowed with one 
unit of labor which is supplied inelastically to firms in order to earn wages. These 
wages are used to finance consumption (of both traded and non-traded goods) 
and savings for retirement through the purchase of land. 
• The retired generation - members of this generation are not endowed with labor. 
They rent out the land they purchased during youth to firms for production. 
Finally they sell their land holdings and use the revenue from the sales as well as 
their rental income in order to consume traded and non-traded goods. 
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Both generations have the same size which stays fixed over time. In other words, each 
period a new generation enters the workforce which replaces the identically sized 
generation that retires from the workforce which in turn is of the same size as the 
previous retired generation that has now died. 
 
Also, this model features three kinds of agents - home agents, migrant agents and 
foreign agents. 
• Home agents – These agents live for both periods in the home country. They can 
buy and sell land only in their home country. 
• Foreign agents – These agents live for both periods in the foreign country (which 
is home for them). Foreign agents can buy and sell land only in the foreign 
country. 
• Migrant agents – These agents live in the foreign country in the first period but 
relocate to their home country for retirement. Migrant agents can only buy and 
sell land in their home country even though they live, work and consume goods 
in the foreign country during their youth. 
Again, the population size of both the home country and foreign country stays fixed and 
the fraction of the home country young employed abroad stays fixed over time. In the 
model, populations are normalized in terms of the number of home country citizens 
(citizens include home agents and migrants), which is given a value of 2. 
 The demographic structure can be described thus: 
Total population of home country citizens = 2  
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Fraction of young home country citizens that are migrants = α 
Total population of home country citizens = 2 x F 




Young home agents 1 - α 
Total young agents at home 1 - α 
Old home agents 1 - α 
Old migrant agents who have returned home α 
Total old agents at home 1 





Young foreign agents F 
Young migrant agents α 
Total young agents abroad F + α 
Total old agents abroad F 







3.2 Preferences and Budget Constraints 
 
Preferences are time separable with an appropriate discount rate for future utility 
during retirement. Agents derive utility by consuming a composite consumption good 
that aggregates tradable and non-tradable goods. The consumption aggregator is of CES 
(constant elasticity of substitution) form with unit elasticity of substitution. This utility 
function is adopted as it is computationally and analytically tractable and is very 
common in the literature. In particular this is the functional form used by Acosta et al 
(2007). Agents receive no disutility from working and hence do not face a labor-leisure 
decision. In log terms, the utility function of an agent who is young in period t can be 
expressed thus: 
log , 1 log , log , 1 log ,  
Where: 
  is the share of tradable goods in total consumption 
,  is the quantity of tradable goods consumed in period t by the young agent  
,  is the quantity of non-tradable goods consumed in period t by the young agent  
,  is the quantity of tradable goods consumed in period t+1 by the old agent  
,  is the quantity of non-tradable goods consumed in period t+1 by the old agent  
 is the discount rate  
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Income and substitution effects perfectly cancel each other with log utility specifications 
and this helps capture the findings of Vargas-Silva and Huang (2005) who emphasize 
that host country conditions largely determine the volume of remittances. 
 
 Agents face a budget constraint in each period of their lives. While young they 
earn wage income which they can spend on traded goods, non-traded goods and savings 
in the form of land holdings. When old, agents earn rental income and sales revenue 
from their land holdings which they spend on traded goods and non-traded goods. It 
should be noted that young migrants receive the same wage and face the same the price 
for non-traded goods as do foreign agents. However as young migrants buy the home 
country’s land, they pay the same price for land as do home agents. Of course, all agents 
regardless of country of residence or immigration status pay the same price for traded 
goods. 
The budget constraints for a home agent who is young in period t can be 
expressed thus: 
When young: ,  ,   
When old: ,  ,   
And with   
Where: 
 is the price of the non-traded good at home at time t  
 is the price of land at home at time t  
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 is the wage rate at home at time t  
 is the rental income from land at home at time t  
 is the amount of land the agent chooses to buy (in order to rent and sell later) 
 
The budget constraints for a foreign agent who is young in period t can be 
expressed thus (decision variables of foreign agents are starred): 
When young: ,  ,   
When old: ,  ,   
And with  
Where: 
  is the price of the non-traded good abroad at time t  
  is the price of land abroad at time t  
  is the wage rate abroad at time t  
  is the rental income from land abroad at time t  
 
The budget constraints for a migrant agent who is young in period t can be 
expressed thus (decision variables of migrants are accented with a tilde): 
When young: ,  ,   
When old: ,  ,   




 equals  in every case since the amount of land a young agent buys in 
period t is the amount of land he can rent and sell as an old agent in period t+1. Prices 
are normalized in terms of the tradable good which has unit price in both countries.  
Therefore, the utility maximization problem of the home agent is: 
 
The utility maximization problem of the foreign agent is: 
max
, ; , ; , ; , ;
log , 1 log ,
log , 1 log ,  
Subject to  ,  ,   
  ,  ,    
   
Maximization Problem 1 
max
, ; , ; , ; , ;
log , 1 log ,
log , 1 log ,  
Subject to  ,  ,   
  ,  ,    
   





Therefore, the utility maximization problem of the migrant agent is: 
 
3.3 Land and Production Technology 
 
 In each country the amount of land is fixed. Land is immobile and is bought from 
old agents by young agents wishing to save. Prior to selling it, old agents rent out their 
land holdings to firms who use it while producing traded goods. The total amount of land 
in the home country is given by  and the total amount of land in the foreign country is 
given by . 
 There are two sectors in each country. The factors of production for the tradable 
goods sector are land and labor while the non-traded sector requires only labor. Labor is 
perfectly mobile between sectors in the same country, enforcing a uniform wage for both 
max
, ; , ; , ; , ;
log , 1 log ,
log , 1 log ,  
Subject to  ,  ,   
  ,  ,    
   
Maximization Problem 3 
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sectors. Including an immobile factor such as land sector ensures that traded goods are 
produced in both economies regardless of the relative total factor productivity between 
the home and foreign country. The non-traded sector too is active in both economies 
simply because agents desire both types of goods and non-traded goods by definition do 
not cross borders. Each sector in each country is represented by a perfectly competitive 
firm that maximizes profits by choosing the amount of labor to hire (and land to rent, for 
traded goods firms) while producing with a constant returns to scale technology – with a 
Cobb-Douglas structure for the traded goods sector and a linear form for the non-traded 
goods sector. The different sectors in different countries have different total factor 
productivities. 
 
The profit maximization problem for the traded goods sector at home is: 
Where: 
,  is the amount of land demanded by the home firm in the traded goods sector 
,  is the amount of labor demanded by the home firm in the traded goods sector 
 is the total factor productivity of the home firm in the traded goods sector 
 is the share of land in production 
 
The profit maximization problem for the traded goods sector abroad is: 
max
, , ,
 , , , ,  
Maximization Problem 4 
max
, , ,
 , , , ,  




,  is the amount of land demanded by the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
,  is the amount of labor demanded by the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
  is the total factor productivity of the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
 
The profit maximization problem for the non-traded goods sector at home is: 
Where: 
 is the amount of labor demanded by the home firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 is the total factor productivity of the home firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 
The profit maximization problem for the non-traded goods sector abroad is: 
Where: 
 is the amount of labor demanded by the foreign firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 is the total factor productivity of the foreign firm in the non-traded goods sector 
Again, it should be noted that all prices (including wage rates and rents) are normalized 
in terms of the price of the traded good which has a unit price in both countries. As all 
max
,
, ,  
Maximization Problem 6 
max
 ,
, ,  
Maximization Problem 7 
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the firms are competitive, they make zero profits and factors of production are paid their 




Remittances in this model are the savings made by young migrant agents. The 
remittance made by each young migrant agent in period t  . As the number of 
young migrant agents in any period is given by α, the total remittances made in period t 
  . The model does not specify to whom exactly each remittance goes. The 
remittances are received by old agents at home and they include migrants who have 
retired and are now at home as well as old home agents who never ventured abroad. 
 
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions 
Only the market clearing condition for the traded good is common to both 






1 , , , , , ,  , ,
 , ,   
 
Non-traded Goods: 
Home: 1 , ,  ,   ,   
Foreign: , ,  ,  ,    
 
Land for Production: 
Home: 1  ,   
Foreign: ,  
 
Land for Sales: 
Home: 1  1    
Foreign:    
 
Labor: 
Home: , , 1  
Foreign: , ,  
Market Clearing Conditions 
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3.6 Steady State Equilibrium 
A Steady State Equilibrium is defined as a set of time-independent prices, wages, 
rents and allocations for consumption, labor and land such that all maximization 
problems are solved subject to their respective constraints and all markets clear. The 
model was solved and a unique steady state was obtained. 
 
4 Calibration and Solution Techniques 
 
 
Some of the parameters used in this model were assumed due to normalization or 
obtained from other studies. The share of labor in the production of traded goods was 
assumed to be 0.7 – this is standard in the literature in general and used in particular for 
traded goods by Acosta et al (2007) in a remittances model used for detecting Dutch 
Disease. Amount of land per worker in both countries was assumed to be one – this is 
the value used by Klein and Ventura (2007) for a model of migration. The total factor 
productivity in the home country was fixed at one. Similarly, by normalization, the 
population of young at home was set to one. 
Other demographic parameters were computed directly from the data. As South 
Africa is about 24 times more populous than Lesotho, foreign young population was 
assigned the value 24. The fraction of young home country citizens who are migrants 
was calculated from the data to be about 0.2.  
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The remaining parameters were obtained by solving the model and matching key 
ratios obtained from the model to corresponding ratios from the data. These ratios were 
used so that the difference between model time (2 periods equal one lifetime) and data 
time (one period equals one year) would not affect results. The parameters obtained thus 
are given in Table 4 and the values of the ‘moments’ used from the data and the model 
are given in Table 5. All the variables in the model other than the price for non-traded 
goods at home were solved for analytically. To solve for price, a computational 
technique was used such that there was no excess demand in the market for traded 
goods.   
 Moments from Data Moments from Model
Ratio of Traded Sector to Total GDP 
at Home 
0.316 0.316 
Ratio of Home to Foreign GDP per 
capita 
0.233 0.234 
Ratio of Remittances to GDP 0.253 0.255 







Parameters obtained from model solution 
Discount factor for old utility (β) 0.463 
Traded TFP abroad (At*) 4.343 
Non-traded TFP abroad  (Ant*) 1.544 
Weight parameter for traded goods (γ) 0.456 
Table 5 
 
Some of the moments that were not matched explicitly also yielded similar 
values for the data and model. These are given in Table 6. The discount factor for old 
utility obtained implies that the duration of working age is about 15 years if we assume 
the common value of 0.95 for annual discount. This number has some support from the 
data due to the fact that the average tenure of a Masotho miner is between 13 and 16 
years according to Van der Weil (1977). 
 Moments from Data Moments from Model
Ratio of Home Traded to Foreign 
Traded 
0.012 0.01 










5 Results and Implications 
 
 Once the model was solved numerous exercises were conducted in order to 
obtain a better understanding of the causes and impact of remittances. 
 
For the first exercise, the total factor productivity of the traded sector abroad was 
changed. This led to an increase in remittances, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and a decrease in the share of traded goods produced at home. This indicates that when 
the foreign country becomes more productive in the traded goods sector, migrants remit 
more traded goods to their home country and in turn the home country manufactures 
fewer traded goods. Figure 5 below shows this graphically.  
 
The term '% Deviation' used in the figure refers to how different the value under 
consideration is in the alternative scenario compared to the corresponding value obtained 
through model solution discussed in the previous section. Also, ‘Home structure of 
Production’ is defined as the ratio of the value of traded goods manufactured at home to 
the value of the total GDP at home. Thus, to obtain the first points on Figure 1, all 
parameters were kept the same as in the calibrated solution except for the TFP of the 
traded sector abroad. This TFP was first by decreased by 1% (a change of -1%) and the 
values of the variables obtained thus were compared in percent terms to their values 
from the original calibrated solution. These percent changes were then plotted (on the y- 






Next, the total factor productivity of the non-traded sector was changed abroad. 
This caused no change in remittances, a depreciation of the real exchange rate and no 
change in the share of traded goods in home production. This implies that when the 
foreign country becomes more productive in the non-traded goods sector, migrants do 
not remit more traded goods to their home country and the home country's structure of 

















% Deviation of Foreign Traded TFP
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances






The total factor productivity of the traded sector at home was changed next. 
Again, remittances stayed unchanged while the real exchange rate depreciated and share 
of traded goods produced at home increased. Thus, when the home country becomes 
more productive in the traded goods sector, migrants do not change their remittances. 
The home country's structure of production however changes as more traded goods are 
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Finally, the total factor productivity of the non-traded sector at home was 
changed. This also resulted in unchanged remittances. The real exchange rate 
appreciated and there was no change in the share of traded goods in home production. 
This indicates that when the home country becomes more productive in the traded goods 
sector, migrants do not change their remittances and the home country's structure of 
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Together, these graphs indicate that remittances do not change with any change 
in the TFPs at home and rise only when traded TFP changes abroad. The real exchange 
rate appreciates when the foreign traded sector or home non-traded sector becomes more 
productive. Conversely, the real exchange rate depreciates when the foreign non-traded 
sector or home non-traded sector becomes more productive. The share of the traded 
sector at home is positively related with its own TFP and negatively related with foreign 
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In order to study how the volume of migration affects remittances and other 
variables, an exercise similar to the ones above was conducted, this time by varying 
alpha (the percent of young home citizens who are migrants) and recording its impact on 




Predictably, as migration increases, so do remittances. When remittances increase 
due to increased migration, there is some evidence of the Dutch Disease as the traded 















Fraction of Migrants in Labor Force
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances
% Deviation of Real Exchange Rate
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the real exchange rate). This corroborates the various empirical and theoretical studies 
discussed in previous sections and suggests that concerns about the Dutch disease may 
be indeed founded. However, on closer examination it can be seen that despite the Dutch 
disease, the home country welfare increases significantly from increased migration. 
Welfare gain here is defined in terms of the composite consumption good per period. 
While home agents gain from increased migration the same does not hold true for 
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Aggregate welfare on the other hand, obtained by summing up population-
weighted welfare increases significantly with an increase in migration as can be seen in 
Figure 13. In fact, when plotted on the same scale as in Figure 14, it can be seen that the 
benefits of increased migration for home agents is orders of magnitude greater than the 
costs of increased migration for foreign agents. 
 
This suggests that allowing more immigrant workers from a poor economy might 
be an effective way to boost the welfare of its agents. To test this quantitatively, another 
counterfactual exercise was conducted. Instead of allowing migration, the foreign 
country is now made to donate a certain amount of foreign aid to the home country. The 
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% Deviation of Home Resident Welfare
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% Deviation of Aggregate Welfare
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welfare unchanged when compared to the situation in which migration is allowed but no 
aid is transferred. The foreign country's government extracts the foreign aid through 
equal lump sum taxation of all its citizens and then transfers this aid to the home country 
government which in turn provides equal lump sum transfers to all its citizens. Results of 
this exercise are given in Table 7. 
 
Decrease in welfare of foreign citizens when aid used instead of migration 1.2% 
Percent of output that needs to be transferred as foreign aid  0.8% 
Table 7 
 
The overall results of the model and the above exercises in particular suggest that 
remittances are very effective in boosting the welfare of recipient economies despite any 
occurrence of the Dutch Disease. Also, from a donor country's standpoint, allowing 
greater migration from the recipient country is preferable to sending it foreign aid. 
 
 
5.1 The Road Ahead and Future Work  
 
  
 While this model provides good intuition, it does not capture dynamic and 
stochastic effects. A computable model that incorporates these features can provide more 
accurate results. Capital could also be added to the model instead of or in addition to 
land. With capital included in the model, agents can respond to changes in migration by 
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adjusting their behavior in terms of capital as well. By adding a labor-leisure choice, this 
model can also be used to test whether remittances cause a decrease in the total labor 
hours in the recipient country. Finally, this model considers only one source of 
remittances – that of savings by migrants who return to their home country for 
retirement. This is indeed applicable for some countries such as UAE, where migrant 
workers have restricted land ownership rights and cannot become permanent residents. 
However, an alternative model that allows remittances to be driven by other motives 
such as altruism would be more widely applicable. In the next chapter, an altruism-based 




The Macroeconomic Impact of Migrant Remittances in an 
Altruistic Model 
 
This chapter is closely related to the previous one as this exercise too studies the 
impact of migrant remittances on welfare, consumption, savings and the structure of 
production between traded and non-traded sectors in both the remittance sending and the 
remittance receiving countries. Once again, micro foundations are used to model 
remittances which in this chapter are driven by family decisions rather than through the 
savings motive of migrants. In order to facilitate convenient and accurate comparisons 
with the previous chapter, a similar steady state model is constructed, solved and 
calibrated with data from South Africa and Lesotho. The results show that remittances 
are influenced by the economic prospects in the both the host country and the recipient 
country in the altruistic framework. As with the previous chapter, restricting migration 
reduces both home country and aggregate welfare even though migrant remittances 
contribute to ‘Dutch Disease.’ In this model, the citizens of the host country would suffer 
an even more severe welfare loss (3.7% as opposed to 1.2% in the overlapping-
generations model) in terms of per period consumption if they were to choose assisting 








 In the previous chapter, the relevance of remittances and some of the major areas 
of current research in the area were discussed. In this paper, it is assumed that 
remittances are driven by altruism rather than savings motives. However, the questions 
posed are similar – what macroeconomic factors drive remittances, do remittances cause 
Dutch Disease and what are the welfare effects of remittances? 
 
The model used is deliberately constructed to closely match the previous model 
so as to facilitate convenient comparisons. The model has two sectors (traded and non-
traded), two countries (host/sending/foreign and home/recipient) and dynastic 
households rather than overlapping-generations. The households of the home country 
have a certain fraction of their members working as migrants in the host country. 
Households maximize a household-level problem and this can be thought of as implying 
altruistic behavior among the members. Similarly, since households are dynasties, the 
model features inter-generational altruism as well. Thus, a home country household’s 
optimal solution might involve transfers from its migrant members to its resident 
members and this is modeled as remittances in this paper. 
 
As in the previous paper, data from South Africa and Lesotho are used to 
calibrate the model and estimate parameters. The solution of this model also suggests 
that remittances are welfare enhancing despite their contribution to the phenomenon of 
94 
 
Dutch Disease. However, the gains from remittances are higher in this model and 
moreover, this model yields the interesting result that even foreign households gain from 
increased migration. Thus, the results of previous chapter are magnified in this chapter 
and here, the host country gains even higher welfare by allowing migration from the 
home country rather than providing it equivalent foreign aid. 
 
 
1.1 Related Literature 
 
  The general literature pertaining to remittances in a macroeconomic framework 
was discussed in the previous chapter. The primary difference between this and the 
previous chapter pertains to savings motives. Rapoport and Docquier (2005) present a 
very detailed and methodical discussion of the various possible motives behind 
remittances. These include altruism, exchange for services provided in the home country, 
as a strategy to deter more migration, as an insurance arrangement, as a family loan 
arrangement where the migrant repays his debt to the family, as a means to retain the 
rights of inheritance etc. After closely studying evidence from microeconomic literature 
and empirical studies of survey data, Rapoport and Docquier (2005) conclude: 
On the whole, the evidence from micro surveys confirms that patterns of 
remittances are better explained as familial inter-temporal contracts than 
as a result of altruism or other purely individualistic considerations. This 
is not to deny the importance of individualistic motives, however, since 
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altruism, intentions to return, and prospects for inheritance explain why 
implicit migration contracts emerge mainly if not exclusively within a 
familial context. 
 
In this paper, ‘altruism’ is not used in the strict sense of Rapoport and Docquier 
(2005). Rather, the word altruism is used to suggest a familial motive for remittances; 
this is clear from the model (described in the next section) which features household 
level decision making and utility maximization. This approach abstracts away from 
intra-household game theoretic elements while maintaining the relevance of the family 
since a household can be thought of as an arrangement where a household-level 
benevolent dictator makes all decisions and is constrained only by the entire household’s 
budget. 
 As the data have been discussed in the previous chapter, the next section 
presents the model. Section three provides details regarding the calibration while the 
results and implications of the model are discussed in the fourth section. 
 
3 Model  
 
 The data are analyzed using a two-country, two-sector, general equilibrium 
model with perpetually lived household-dynasties. All dynasties in a given country are 
assumed to be identical. A constant fraction of the members of a home household-
dynasty is situated as migrants in the foreign country. Remittances in this model take the 
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form of the effective transfers made by a migrant to the rest of her home household. To 
permit easy comparison, all other features of the model are left unchanged from the 
previous chapter. Thus, the model abstracts away from capital and as all dynasties in a 
given country are identical, each owns a fixed fraction of the land. As in the previous 
model, land in a particular country can only be bought and sold by a household 
belonging to that country. However, as all households in this model are identical, land is 
not bought or sold in any period. Hence land markets are ignored in the model and each 
household is given a fixed perpetual share of land. Although this model can be easily 
extended to a dynamic framework, in order to retain the similarity with the model in the 
previous chapter all parameters (most notably, the TFPs) and the resultant variables are 
assumed to be time independent. Since none of the decisions are inter-temporal, this 
model reduces to a very simple general equilibrium model that can be solved 
analytically. Yet, the model is rich in terms of the features it can be used to study and 





 This decision making unit in this model is the household rather than the agent. 
All households in a given country are identical and all members within a household are 
considered to be working age. Since the previous model included equal numbers of 
working and non-working agents, in order to stay consistent, every agent in this model is 
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endowed with only 0.5 units of labor (as opposed to the 1 unit of the previous paper). 
Thus, the effective labor force to population ratio for this model too is 0.5. The model 
has two kinds of households – home households and foreign households: 
• Home households – a fraction of each household resides abroad as migrants. The 
rest of the household stays in the home country. Unlike the previous model, there 
are no overlapping-generations and each home household member can either be a 
working migrant or a working resident and is endowed with 0.5 units of labor. 
This labor is supplied inelastically in order to earn wages. Migrants earn the 
foreign wage rate while residents earn the home wage rate. These wages are 
pooled together and used to finance the consumption of traded and non-traded 
goods both by migrants (who obtain non-traded goods from the foreign country 
at foreign prices) and residents (who get their non-traded good from home at 
home prices).  
• Foreign households – All members of foreign households stay in the country. 
Again, unlike the previous model, there are no distinctions between retired and 
working members – all members are considered to be working and are each 
endowed with 0.5 units of labor for consistency with the previous model. This 
labor is supplied inelastically in order to earn wages. These wages are used to 




 As with the previous chapter, populations are normalized in terms of the number 
of home country citizens (citizens include home agents and migrants), which is given a 
value of 2. The demographic structure can be described thus: 
Total population of home country citizens = 2  
Fraction of citizens that are migrants = α 
Total population of home country citizens = 2 x F 
Effective labor force to population ratio for each country = 0.5 
 
 
3.2 Preferences and Budget Constraints 
 
Rather than individuals maximizing their utility, preferences in this model are 
given in terms of households. The household planner collects all the resources and 
redistributes them to maximize a household level utility function. 
 The model allows the planner of the home household to assign different weights 
to the migrants and residents. The weights assigned by the planner are assumed to be 
proportional but not equal to the population weights as migrants and residents may have 
different bargaining powers due to their differences in income.  
Utility for the home household is therefore derived as the appropriately weighted 
sum of migrant and resident utilities, which in turn are derived through the consumption 
of a composite good that aggregates tradable goods and non-tradable goods. As in the 
previous model, the consumption aggregator is of CES (constant elasticity of 
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substitution) form with unit elasticity of substitution. The utility function of the home 
household is given by: 
1 1 log 1 log   log 1 log  
Where: 
  is the share of tradable goods in total consumption 
 is preference weight for migrants  
 is the quantity of tradable goods consumed by the resident 
 is the quantity of non-tradable goods consumed by the resident  
 is the quantity of tradable goods consumed by the migrant  
 is the quantity of non-tradable goods consumed by the migrant  
This formulation ensures that the weight assigned per migrant and the weight assigned 
per resident stay the same regardless of the value of α. While conducting welfare 
calculations with changes in α, the utility value was scaled to ensure that comparisons 
were being made in terms of a constant household size. 
 
Utility for the foreign household is more straightforward as all members are 
weighted equally. The utility function of the foreign household is given by: 
 
log 1 log  
Where: 
 is the quantity of tradable goods consumed by the foreign resident  
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 is the quantity of non-tradable goods consumed by the foreign resident  
 The budget constraint faced by the home household planner is given by: 
1        1 2  2   
Where: 
  is the price of non-traded good in home country 
 is the price of non-traded good in foreign country  
 is the wage rate in home country   
 is the wage rate in foreign country   
 is the rent in home country  
 is the amount of land owned by the home household  
 
As can be seen, the planner is able to collect all the income – the wages earned at 
home by the (1-α) home residents who are each endowed with half a unit of labor, the 
wages earned abroad by α migrants who are also each endowed with half a unit of labor 
and the rent earned from the land. After collecting the income, the planner decides how 
much migrants and residents can consume though she has to keep in mind that the prices 
of non-traded goods differ in the two countries. The budget constraint faced by the 
foreign household planner is straightforward and is given by: 




  is the land owned by a foreign household 
 
Therefore the utility maximization problem of the home household is: 
 
And the utility maximization problem of the foreign household is: 
 
 
3.3 Land and Production Technology 
 
 The model is identical to the one of the previous chapter in terms of the 
production and technology side. However, this has been discussed again below in order 
to present the full set of equations.  
max
; ; ;
 1 1 log 1 log   log
1 log  
Subject to    1        1   
  
Maximization Problem 1 
max
;
log 1 log  
Subject to                    




The total amount of land in the home country is given by  and the total amount 
of land in the foreign country is given by . 
  
There are two sectors in each country. The factors of production for the tradable 
goods sector are land and labor while the non-traded sector requires only labor. Labor is 
perfectly mobile between sectors in the same country, enforcing a uniform wage for both 
sectors. Each sector in each country is represented by a perfectly competitive firm that 
maximizes profits by choosing the amount of labor to hire (and land to rent, for traded 
goods firms) while producing with a constant returns to scale technology – with a Cobb-
Douglas structure for the traded goods sector and a linear form for the non-traded goods 
sector. The different sectors in different countries have different total factor 
productivities. 
 
The profit maximization problem for the traded goods sector at home is: 
Where: 
 is the amount of land demanded by the home firm in the traded goods sector 
 is the amount of labor demanded by the home firm in the traded goods sector 




Maximization Problem 3 
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 is the share of land in production 
 
The profit maximization problem for the traded goods sector abroad is: 
Where: 
 is the amount of land demanded by the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
 is the amount of labor demanded by the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
  is the total factor productivity of the foreign firm in the traded goods sector 
 
The profit maximization problem for the non-traded goods sector at home is: 
Where: 
 is the amount of labor demanded by the home firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 is the total factor productivity of the home firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 




Maximization Problem 4 
max  




 is the amount of labor demanded by the foreign firm in the non-traded goods sector 
 is the total factor productivity of the foreign firm in the non-traded goods sector 
Again, it should be noted that all prices (including wage rates and rents) are normalized 
in terms of the price of the traded good which has a unit price in both countries. As all 
the firms are competitive, they make zero profits and factors of production are paid their 




Remittances in this model are given by the difference between the income and 
consumption of the migrant fraction of home households. This is given by: 
 2    
As the number of households is given by 2, the total remittances are given by: 
2  2    
 




Maximization Problem 6 
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Only the market clearing condition for the traded goods is common to both 






3.6 Steady State Equilibrium 
A Steady State Equilibrium is defined as a set of time-independent prices, wages, 
rents and allocations for consumption, labor and land such that all maximization 
problems are solved subject to their respective constraints and all markets clear. The 
model was solved and a unique steady state was obtained. 
Traded Goods: 
2 1  2  2      
 
Non-traded Goods: 
Home: 2 1      
Foreign: 2 2     
 
Land for Production: 
Home: 2   
Foreign: 2  
 
Labor: 
Home: 1  
Foreign:  
Market Clearing Conditions 
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4 Calibration and Solution Techniques 
 
 
As in the previous chapter, some of the parameters used in this model were 
assumed due to normalization or obtained from other studies. The share of labor in the 
production of traded goods was assumed to be 0.7. The amount of land per worker in 
both countries was assumed to be one. The total factor productivity in the home country 
was fixed at one. Similarly, by normalization, the population at home was set to 2. The 
demographic parameters were computed directly from the data. As South Africa is about 
24 times more populous than Lesotho, foreign population was assigned the value 48 (as 
home was assigned a value of 2). The fraction of home country citizens who are 
migrants was also set to 0.2 as in the previous chapter.  
The remaining parameters were obtained by solving the model and matching key 
ratios to corresponding ratios from the data. The same ratios are chosen for this chapter 
as for the previous chapter. The only parameter that is different in this model is δ, the 
weight assigned by the home household planner to a migrant (relative to 1- δ, the weight 
for of the resident). This parameter replaces β, used in the previous model as the 
preference weight for old migrants. As the value obtained for δ is greater than 0.5, it 
indicates that the planner weights migrant utilities higher than resident utilities.  
The parameter values are given in Table 1 and the values of the ‘moments’ used 
from the data and the model are given in Table 2.  
108 
 
 Moments from Data Moments from Model
Ratio of Traded Sector to Total GDP 
at Home 
0.316 0.316 
Ratio of Home to Foreign GDP per 
capita 
0.233 0.233 
Ratio of Remittances to GDP 0.253 0.253 
Real Exchange Rate 1.58 1.58 
Table 1 
 
Parameters obtained from model solution 
 Preference weight for migrants (δ) 0.644 
Traded TFP abroad (At*) 4.396 
Non-traded TFP abroad  (Ant*) 1.567 
Weight parameter for traded goods (γ) 0.454 
Table 2 
 
Some of the moments that were not matched explicitly also yielded similar 




 Moments from Data Moments from Model
Ratio of Home Traded to Foreign 
Traded 
0.012 0.01 








5 Results and Implications 
 
 After the model was solved, numerous exercises similar to the ones in the last 
chapter were conducted in order to obtain a better understanding of the causes and 
impact of remittances in an altruistic model. The results were then compared to those 
obtained in the last chapter as well. 
 
Changing the foreign traded sector’s total factor productivity led to an increase in 
remittances, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a decrease in the share of 
traded goods produced at home. This indicates that when the foreign country becomes 
more productive in the traded goods sector, migrants remit more traded goods to their 
home country and in turn the home country manufactures fewer traded goods. Figure 1 
below shows this graphically. This result was not different qualitatively from the 
corresponding result of the previous chapter, however in terms of magnitude, remittances 
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and the structure of production changed more for a given change in TFP while the real 





Changing the total factor productivity of the non-traded sector abroad yielded 
almost identical results for both the altruistic and the overlapping-generations model. 
The only variable under consideration that changed along with the TFP change was the 
















% Deviation of Foreign Traded TFP
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances






Next, in the altruistic model, an increase in home’s traded TFP led to a decrease 
in remittances decreased, real exchange rate depreciation and more traded goods 
produced at home. This result contrasts sharply with the result in the overlapping-
generations model where remittances stayed unchanged. In other words, with altruism 
given the current framework and parameters, remittances display a countercyclical 
pattern relative to the traded sector at home. On the other hand, in the overlapping-















% Deviation of Foreign Non-traded TFP
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances
% Deviation of Real Exchange Rate
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country variables. In the literature too, altruism and family arrangements are often used 





Finally, to conclude the TFP related exercises, home’s non-traded TFP was 
changed. The results obtained thus were no different from the results of the overlapping-
generations model. The real exchange rate was positively correlated with the non-traded 
















% Deviation of Home Traded TFP
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances







Together, these graphs indicate that in these model setups, remittances do not 
change with any change in non-traded TFPs. When traded TFP is changed abroad 
remittances are affected in both models while a change in the traded TFP at home has an 
impact only in the altruistic case. The real exchange rate appreciates when the foreign 
traded sector or home non-traded sector becomes more productive. Conversely, the real 
exchange rate depreciates when the foreign non-traded sector or home non-traded sector 
















% Deviation of Home Non-traded TFP
% Deviation of Home Structure of Production
% Deviation of Remittances
% Deviation of Real Exchange Rate
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produced at home and the real exchange rate appreciates as well lending support to the 
idea of Dutch Disease. The share of the traded sector at home is positively correlated 
with its own TFP and negatively correlated with foreign traded TFP. The share of the 
traded-sector does not change with any change in the non-traded TFPs. 
 
The next exercise involved changing ‘α’, the fraction of home citizens who are 
migrants.  The impact of changing α on the amount remitted by migrants, the real 
exchange rate and the structure of production are shown in Figure 5. Interestingly, once 
again, a rise in remittances (caused by increased migration rather than TFP changes) is 
accompanied by a depreciation of the real exchange rate. At the same time though, there 
is evidence of Dutch Disease since production at home shifts towards the non-traded 
sector. However, unlike the overlapping-generations model, remittances rise at a rapidly 
decreasing rate – and correspondingly, the structure of production and the real exchange 
rate also do not change as quickly with greater increases in migration. This can be 
explained intuitively from the fact that when the number of migrants increases, so does 
their assigned weight in the household level planner’s problem. One way to interpret this 
would be to say that migrants get more say in the household’s optimization problem, 
they remit less. 
When remittances increase due to increased migration, there is some evidence of 
Dutch Disease as the traded sector at home shrinks (even though real exchange rates 
fall). This corroborates the various empirical and theoretical studies discussed in the 






Once again, though as in the previous chapter, on closer examination it can be 
seen that despite any ill-effects of Dutch Disease, home country welfare increases 
significantly from increased migration. In fact, unlike the previous overlapping- 
generations model, even foreign households gain from increased migration (although to 
a lesser extent). Therefore, aggregate welfare increases as well with increased migration. 
The magnitude of home welfare gain is much higher than aggregate or foreign welfare 
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% Deviation of Fraction of Migrants 
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In order to better understand why the model with altruism results in welfare gain 
for both home and foreign households, the key prices faced abroad are plotted. Figure 10 
shows these variables for the overlapping-generations model while Figure 11 portrays 
the results from the altruistic model. 
 
Figure 10 (Note: This result is from the previous chapter) 
 
It can be seen that an increase in migration helps foreign agents by lowering the 
price level and raising rental incomes. However, in the case of the overlapping-
















% Deviation of Fraction of Migrants
% Deviation of Foreign Price Level
% Deviation of Foreign Rent
% Deviation of Foreign Welfare







In the model with altruism between migrants and their resident households, once 
again, increased migration leads to lower prices, higher rental income and lower wages. 
Unlike the overlapping-generations model, the gains from lower prices and higher rental 
incomes exceeds the losses from lower wages and increased migration makes even 
foreign households better off. 
The results from the altruistic model also suggest that allowing more immigrant 
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% Deviation of Foreign Wage
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households. As with the overlapping-generations model, this was tested using the same 
counterfactual exercise. When foreign aid is used as a means to help the home 
(remittance receiving) country instead of allowing migration, residents of the donor 
country are worse off. Details of this exercise have been presented in the previous 
chapter and hence are not repeated here. The results (Table 7) show that the welfare of 
foreign citizens would decrease if foreign aid were used instead of migration to assist the 
home country.  
Decrease in welfare of foreign citizens when aid used instead of migration 3.7% 
Percent of traded goods that needs to be transferred as foreign aid  0.3% 
Table 4 
 
The altruism model supports the main findings of the overlapping-generations 
model. Remittances are indeed very effective in boosting the welfare of recipient 
economies despite any occurrence of Dutch Disease. Additionally, in the altruistic 
model, remittances are countercyclical with respect to the home country’s traded sector 
TFP. A dynamic model could potentially capture the gains that remittances could 
provide home households through the channel of consumption smoothing as well.  
 
 





 The obvious next step for this work is to solve a dynamic stochastic model that 
can capture the current benefits of remittances as well as the added gains through 
consumption smoothing. Adding capital to such a model would provide richer and more 
accurate dynamics. Another possibility is to model the family’s internal optimization 
problem more explicitly within the current macroeconomic framework. Similarly, the 
model can be made more realistic by introducing heterogeneity among home agents and 
allowing migration to become an endogenous decision variable while retaining some of 
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